WWII Tech Pubs Feature

Written by
Daren Beazley

Table of Contents

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Introduction

As The First World War drew to a close and the Treaty of Versailles was signed, apart from a few British built Mk V tanks, the only other tanks in French service that were serviceable were small Renault FT-17 vehicles which were available in large quantities.

The end to hostilities stopped all French tank production dead in its tracks even though a new type of heavy tank, the Char 2C, was designed and manufactured to provide the necessary ‘break-through’ during an offensive planned for the Spring of 1919. General J E Estienne, often considered to be the ‘father’ of the French tank force (Artillerie d’Assault), continued to promote the tank as a potentially decisive battlefield winning weapon if used in large enough quantities. Unfortunately, although he was put in charge of armoured fighting vehicle technical development at the Section Technique des Chars de Combat, French military hierarchy considered tanks as support for infantry formations only.

Undaunted, in July 1920, an instruction was issued calling for the development of a wide variety of tanks. The instruction, obviously influenced by General J E Estienne, was extremely imaginative, wide and far-reaching. It described everything from light machine-gun armed reconnaissance vehicles to heavy ‘break-through’ type tanks along with assault type mobile artillery machines armed with long range howitzers and certain ‘special’ vehicles used for trench and obstacle crossing, wireless relay, supply and some that even mounted search-lights. It was the first attempt in history to create a completely mechanised assault force.

Unfortunately General Estienne’s ideas fell foul of basic French military tactical ideology and it appears he did not have the political clout or military rank to see his ideas through to fruition. As a result, in January 1921, a commission set up under the direction of a General Buat, then Chief of Staff at Army Headquarters, issued revised instructions to the army. The commission firmly established the tank as an infantry weapon and decided that only two types of tank were to be developed. A heavy or ‘break-through’ tank (char de rupture), and a light, versatile ‘battle’ tank (char de battaille). These vehicles were to be developed by and for the infantry and the tactics for their employment fell upon the lessons learned during the First World War. A char de battaille was to be designed and developed as a replacement for the Renault FT-17 series of tanks. This was to eventually mature to become known as the outstanding Char B1 series of vehicles.

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  Prototype

The initial requirement for the Char B1, as drawn up in 1921, called for a 13-ton vehicle with a maximum armour plate thickness of 25mm to be armed with a hull mounted 7.5cm gun for infantry support and two machine-guns situated in a rotating turret.

Four companies were invited to build prototypes although it was under the condition that they allow the army to mix and match parts from the various vehicles that were submitted to eventually produce the best possible vehicle. The companies involved were Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d'Homécourt (FAMH) , Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerraneée (FCM), Delaunay-Belleville and Schneider-Renault. A total of five prototypes were submitted for evaluation of which four were presented at the arsenal Atelier de Construction de Rueil (ARL) in May 1924. Schneider-Renault submitted two prototypes, the SRA and SRB.

The Delaunay-Belleville vehicle was virtually disregarded out of hand by the French Army during the evaluation phase. It was essentially a larger version of the Renault FT-17 and having been designed in 1920 did not meet the requirements or expectations of the army in any way shape or form. The other four prototypes were presented for evaluation during May of 1924 and thoroughly put through their paces during the following summer. The Schneider-Renault SRB was chosen as the basis for the new tank along with its steering mechanism, engine and gearbox. The suspension and running gear were taken from the FAMH designed vehicle and the tracks from the FCM prototype. In March 1925 Renault was chosen as prime contractor with Schneider, FAMH, FCM and Delaunay-Belleville providing work and components as sub-contractors. The final assembly of the vehicle was to take place at the Renault plant in Paris. The construction contract for three prototypes was finally placed with Renault on 17th January 1926.

However, during 1926, the Direction de l'Infanterie, the French Army's directorate for infantry, re-assessed the role of the tank within the French armed forces. They summerised three main classes of vehicle: -

Light tank – was defined as being of less than 13 tons, available in large numbers and to be simple to operate so that reservists could be quickly and easily trained in its use. It was to have a crew of two or three and it would be used in the close support of infantry formations to defeat enemy automatic weapons. It was to be armed with twin co-axial machine-guns or a 47mm gun and to be armoured against weapons carried by enemy infantry.

Battle tank – was defined as being from 19 to 22 tons in weight. It was to have a crew of three or four, equipped with wireless and was to be used in concert with light tanks responsible for engaging heavier resistance as well as other enemy tanks. It was to be armed with a high-velocity gun or 7.5cm gun and to also have several machine-guns. It was to be armoured against infantry weapons of below field gun strength.

Heavy tank – of up to 70 tons, for use during ‘break-through’ type engagements and also where its greater armament was required to support the infantry and the lighter tanks. The Char 2C was already in service but few in number. A total of ten were only ever produced and none were to see action during May of 1940.

Thus le char de battaille was seen as a supplement to light tanks such as the Renault R-35. The new role envisaged for this vehicle was to accompany infantry attacks, tackle enemy tanks if need be and break into enemy rearward positions. Consequently, the Direction de l'Infanterie decided that it was therefore only required in limited numbers.

The real reason for this was mainly due to the fact that after the First World War there was little or no money available for new weapons development. Reparations were not forthcoming from the vanquished German invader. Politicians were apathetic to the needs of the armed forces as a whole. This attitude found support within government circles amongst those who argued, quite logically, that if the German invader was prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles from developing offensive weapons (e.g. tanks and aircraft), then why on earth should the French armed forces develop them? The French State had no wish to invade Germany. Why spend vast sums of capital expenditure on an offensive weapon that would never be needed? All of this occurred at the time when the world was still in the grip of the worst recession in living memory, the Great Depression. The French government, at the time, was already committed to pouring millions of Francs into a great ‘white elephant’ called the Maginot Line. Thus budgets for the development and production of all types of new weapons systems for the armed forces as a whole, including aircraft, ships and tanks therefore suffered greatly.

Thus the requirements goal posts for the le char de battaille, although essentially the same, did move somewhat. It was now to be impervious to all infantry weapons. It was to have an average speed of approximately 15 km/h and to be armed with two machineguns in a rotating turret, two fixed machine guns in the hull and a hull mounted 7.5cm gun.

This unwarranted intervention by the Direction de l'Infanterie halted the manufacture of the three prototypes ordered in 1926 while the whole requirement specification was re-evaluated. Even though the order was re-instated during March of 1927, it was not until January 1929, nearly two years later, that the first prototypes appeared. Trials did not start until April of 1930, over a year after the first prototype rolled off the production line! Thus at least three years of critical design, development and potential manufacturing time were essentially lost mainly due to politics, budget factors and the fact that the French Army did not know what it actually needed, wanted, or even required!

In 1933 the Direction de l'Infanterie further defined vehicle categories after evaluating the combined exercises carried out during 1932 and 1933 to study the use of tanks in the infantry battle. Their main effect was to set new standards in armour protection and to give a new name to the ‘battle’ tank, now classifying it as ‘medium’. However, they did not change the basic roles of the three classes.

Light tank – was to be armoured against light anti-tank weapons.

Medium tank – to be armoured against heavy anti-tank weapons. The Char B and Renault D were later re-classified as medium tanks, although the Char B was ostensibly known as a ‘heavy’ or char de battaille.

Heavy tank - basically the Char 2C. No change.

Further development and production of infantry tanks up to 1940 followed the three basic classifications above.

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  Service Introduction

The first prototype was presented to the trials establishment at Bourges in May 1930. The vehicle, to be christened Char B, weighed 25 tons and carried a crew of four who were protected by a maximum of 25mm of armour. It was armed with one 7.5cm gun situated beside the driver, two hull mounted forward firing machine-guns and two co-axially mounted machine-guns in a revolving one-man turret. The vehicle carried 800 litres of petrol and thus had a radius of action of some 10 to 12 hours. The 180-hp Renault 6-cylinder engine gave the vehicle a speed of 28 km/h. In October 1931 all three prototypes were brought together as a tactical trials unit for exercises at Mourmelon where firing and mobility trials were conducted. The equipment apparently performed ‘perfectly’.

In October 1930 studies were initiated for an upgraded version of the char de bataille. This was based upon experience gained with the Char B1 specifically during tactical trials. A revised statement on the required characteristics of the vehicle was presented. This demanded good mobility, with high speed and good cross-country performance. It was to be heavily armed and armoured and fitted with wireless communication and intercom equipment throughout.

Prototype trials continued with the Char B1and by 1935 the armour thickness had risen to 40mm and weight to 28 tons. There were some, mostly in authority, who held reservations about the vehicle, since the age of the basic design was nearly ten years old but it had, in that time, become an advanced and powerful weapon system with some very nice and unique features. Unfortunately these ‘features’ meant that components were expensive and slow to manufacture and demanding of a high proportion of regular soldiers to operate and maintain. The Char B1 was essentially hand built and did not lend itself to mass production. The German re-occupation of the Rhineland in March 1935 created a situation of crisis that demanded an immediate French re-armament program be instigated. This galvanised the Direction de l'Infanterie, in April 1935, to instigate the manufacture of 40 Char B’s, up-armoured to 60mm. They were to become known officially as the Char B1 bis.

Further design work and trials were carried out to accept the extra and obviously heavier armour. Meanwhile, production started slowly based on the prototype designs, with 40mm armour and with the cast APX 1 turrets carrying a 47mm SA 34 short barreled cannon and machinegun. Only 35 vehicles were delivered before the armour and other improvements were introduced. These early vehicles were referred to as Char B1, although the prototypes are also called Char B1. The new Char B1 bis weighed 32 tons, carried a crew of four and mounted a Renault engine boosted to 300 hp to haul the extra four tonnes. The turret was exchanged for the similar but thicker APX 4 turret mounting the superb high velocity 47mm SA 35 L34 armour piercing cannon, the very same turret and gun that was mounted to the highly effective Somua S-35 cavalry tank.

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  Development

Production continued slowly in peacetime but by May of 1940 the Char B1 bis had become the principal French medium tank along with the Somua S-35. A total of 365 Char B1 bis were manufactured before the French armed forces capitulated in the face of superior German tactics in June of 1940.

The hull of the CharB1was divided into two by a fireproof bulkhead, with the fighting compartment at the front holding the crew of four, and the engine and transmission at the rear. Armour components and armour plates were mounted to steel girders running along each side to form the hull of the vehicle. The suspension assemblies, which incorporated vertically mounted coil springs, were fixed to these girders so that the springs projected upwards into the hull. Armoured skirting plates protected the suspension system, which was developed from the Holt tractor. It comprised of three main assemblies each side, each of four bogies mounted in pairs on plates pivoted at the centre. Each of these plates was mounted at the end of a similar one balanced at the base of vertically mounted coil springs, whilst semi-elliptic leaf springs also came into play as dampers under extreme compression. In addition, but not bearing the weight of the tank, there were four independently mounted bogies (three forward, one rear) controlled by leaf springs. Unusually, the front idler wheel (tensioner) was also spring-mounted. Adjustments for track tension were made from inside the fighting compartment. All this involved considerable lubrication of bearings and guides, but the task was made easier with an arrangement of grease nipples in four groups each side behind small doors in the armoured skirting plates.

The main entrance to the hull was through a square door on the right hand side of the vehicle. The driver had a hatch over his head and there was a side door in the rear of the turret for the commander. An escape hatch was also provided in the hull floor, along with other doors for the disposal of empty ammunition cases.

The engine compartment was itself divided into three parts, left, right and centre. The engine, with associated power train to the gearbox and rear sprockets, was mounted in the centre. A Renault 6-cylinder aircraft engine with magneto ignition, incorporating an unusual compressed air starting system in addition to the normal electric starter motor powered the vehicle. This ‘Viet’ starter system provided independent ignition and a source of mixed fuel and air under pressure to the engines cylinders. This was sufficient to turn the engine slowly until the normal firing sequence started. On the right was a narrow gangway, gained access to by a door in the fireproof bulkhead. This gave access to fuel gauges and extra ammunition but more importantly gave access to yet another escape hatch situated in the roof of the engine deck between the two exhaust ports.

Two self-sealing fuel tanks were situated on the right side with another on the left. Two radiators with fans were mounted on the left along the axis of the tank, so that cooling air was drawn in from above the gangway, across the engine and out through a grill on the left side of the tank.

The driver, who was an extremely busy crewmember, sat at the left front of the vehicle. He was the only crewmember apart from the commander who had any means to see what was going on outside. The driver steered the vehicle by means of a steering wheel, which was connected by chain and rods to the Naeder hydrostatic steering mechanism. The gearbox and transmission incorporated a differential, which was connected directly to the final drive and sprockets, together with an auxiliary differential controlled by the Naeder hydrostatic system for the steering. The Naeder system, in conjunction with this double differential unit, controlled power distribution to each track and permitted the infinitely fine variations in steering, which were vital in aiming the 7.5cm main gun.

Brake drums were mounted externally at each end of the auxiliary differential, operated with servo-assistance by the driver's hand brakes and pedal. These brakes could also be used for steering. The driver changed gear, by means of a lever situated to his right and used his feet to control the accelerator, brake and clutch pedals, in the normal way.

Also to the driver’s right was the elevating hand-wheel for the 7.5cm gun. This weapon was mounted behind a mantlet bolted to the hull front. Movement of this gun in elevation operated a linkage mechanism that automatically turned prismatic binocular sights mounted on the driver's hood in a way that was parallel with the gun trunnions. The sights rotated behind a pair of vertical slits beneath the driver's scope. The gun, however, was fixed in azimuth. Gun laying for line was effected by swinging the vehicle in azimuth, hence the need for the Naeder hydrostatic steering mechanism. This weapon incorporated an unusual feature found mostly in naval gun turrets. Upon firing, fumes from the gun were literally blown out through the muzzle by the Luchard air compressor and air-blast system fitted to the 7.5cm gun.

As if the driver was not already doing enough he was also, often, responsible for firing (by cable) the fixed machine-gun that was mounted low in the hull and to the right of the 7.5cm gun. Alternatively the firing handle could be repositioned in the tank roof where the tank commander could have access. There was limited movement of the machine-gun in elevation but, as with the 7.5cm gun, it was fixed for line.

The loader and wireless operator were both situated at the base of the tank commander’s feet. The loader performed a number of duties. He was to serve the two hull guns, fit fuses to the 7.5cm shells when needed and also provide ammunition to the tank commander when rounds were used up from racks immediately to hand. The ammunition for all weapons was stowed in bins or racks fixed to the walls of the hull or under the floor of the fighting compartment. As mentioned previously, ammunition was also stowed in the engine compartment.

The tank commander was the sole occupant of the cast APX 4 turret, which was mounted centrally but towards the rear of the fighting compartment. This turret, in the case of the Char B1 bis, mounted the 4.7cm SA 35 high velocity armour piercing cannon along with a machine-gun and was equipped with electric power traverse. The turret was identical to that mounted to the Somua S-35 tank, while the APX 1 turret mounted to the earlier Char B1, housed a short-barreled 47mm SA 34 gun with less armour and was the same as that mounted to the Char D2. The turret was known as the ‘command post’ and included the wireless set, inter-comm control box, a gyroscopic direction indicator and a binnacle-mounted compass. The gyroscope was driven by compressed air supplied from the same Luchard air compressor through a reserve air bottle mounted beside the driver.

The Char B was a sophisticated vehicle with some technically advanced features. Its complexity was probably to see its downfall for it was difficult to manufacture and maintain, whilst it’s layout and demands on the crew hindered the efficient use of its weapons in battle unlike German manufactured tanks of the time. It was, in effect, a heavily armoured self-propelled assault gun, an equivalent to the German manufactured Sturmgeschütz but which also carried a rather potent anti-tank gun in a separate turret. Certain features of the Char B are said to have influenced the design of the British Churchill tank, which was initially designed with a 3-inch howitzer mounted beside the driver. The Char B1 bis was regarded as an extremely powerful weapon in its day and stood up well to attack by all German anti-tank guns, except, of course, the dreaded 88mm, which was to become the bane of all Allied tank crews throughout the entire war.

At the same time that funds were made available in 1935 for production of the Char B1, instructions were given for subsequent development of the vehicle to remedy certain disadvantages found in the B1 and B1 bis. These included vulnerability of the sidewalls and tracks to armour piercing shells. Practical experience had also shown that there were distinct disadvantages in laying the gun for line solely by turning the tank and this was to be addressed. The new design was to give the 7.5cm gun a mounting with limited traverse of 5 degrees each way. The opportunity was then taken to make space for a fifth crewmember, described as a mechanic. The APX 4 turret was retained and armament remained the same. The new vehicle was dubbed the Char B1 ter, with the first of three prototypes rolling off the line at Rueil in 1937.

The vehicle was presented before M Daladier at Satory in 1937 and incorporated several improvements over and above those listed such as a 350-hp engine and protection against gas attack. Testing of the prototype ran from 1937 to 1940. The official test report described the gasoline supply as of ‘insufficient capacity’ and complained about ‘fragile’ electrical installation. In conclusion, the Char B1 ter presented little interest to the French armed forces at the time and that its mass production was only to be considered when all defects had been ‘cured’. Little by little the necessary modifications were made and by January of 1939 the vehicle was again ready for testing. The weight of the vehicle had increased to 36.6 tonnes and a decision was made to increase the power of the engine, yet again, to 400-hp. By April of 1940 another two prototypes had been completed, one by FCM and another by Fives-Lille. As hostilities commenced in May of 1940 and the situation in France became steadily unbearable all three prototypes were embarked aboard a cargo liner in June of 1940 which was unfortunately sunk before reaching its final destination and so no examples of this unique vehicle exist today.

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  Theatres of Service

General Estienne, in the years immediately following the First World War, had advocated the replacement of the Renault FT series by a new and more powerful char de bataille, as detailed earlier. He wished for this vehicle to exercise a decisive influence in operations by its mobility and use in mass numbers as part of a totally independent mechanised force, which included motorised infantry and self-propelled artillery. Colonel Fuller and Liddell Hart had virtually come to the same conclusions and made largely the same recommendations to the British armed forces across the English Channel but in France these recommendations went unheeded amongst a General Staff which utterly refused to contemplate conditions of war beyond that of 1918. This blinkered view resigned tanks to control by infantry officers and further development for any other purpose other than infantry support was stifled. Indeed, this is how the position stayed in the French armed forces for the next two decades.

As a result the headquarters of the wartime Artillerie d’Assaut, which might have served as the nucleus of an independent armoured force, was disbanded in 1920. There would be no testing or development of radical new ideas on armoured warfare without a new and independent arm such as the Royal Tank Corps in Britain, or the Panzerwaffe in Germany. Whereas the German Panzertruppen made great strides in armoured fighting vehicle formations and tactical doctrine between the two world wars, the French however, made virtually no progress at all.

However, ironically, it was the French cavalry that was the first to create an armoured formation designed to operate entirely on its own. Mechanisation of French cavalry divisions had developed quicker than in Britain, so much so, that by as early as 1930 one horsed brigade was replaced by a regiment of motorised riflemen (dragons portés). In 1932, the detachment of 36 armoured cars in said division was enlarged to 80 in number. Cavalry and infantry divisions then both took part in combined exercises of mechanised detachments. Upon the conclusion of these exercises the cavalry then went ahead and assembled a fully motorised division the following year. This led to the permanent formation of the first Ire Division Légère Mécanique (DLM) in 1934. This preceded by four years the British Mobile Division and by one year that of the first German panzer division. The distinction to make here was that the first DLM had gradually evolved during a process of mechanisation and was not a product of new thought on the conduct of armoured warfare as was the case in Germany. The DLM’s role was restricted to one of strategic reconnaissance, security and the protection of infantry formations. It did, however, resemble the organisation of an early panzer division, more by luck than judgement.

The development of both French infantry and cavalry vehicles continued slowly albeit in tandem during peacetime. From 1935 the industrial and military technical resources for armoured fighting vehicles were brought together under one roof and by the late 1930's both cavalry and infantry armoured fighting vehicles were generally of comparable performance. They were often armed with the same guns, used the same ammunition and some even used the same turrets, the Char B1 bis and Somua S-35 for instance.

In 1938 the second DLM was formed and a third was added in August 1939. A fourth was being assembled in May 1940, but was never completed. The organisation of a DLM consisted of a combat brigade with two regiments each of 87 tanks, two squadrons of armoured cars and two of motorcyclists for reconnaissance, with a motorised rifle regiment consisting of three battalions of dragons portés that each included a squadron of 20 tracked autos-mitrailleuses.

During the winter and spring of 1939/40 another type of cavalry formation with tanks was formed when three horsed cavalry divisions were broken up and five horsed brigades were released to join five new partially mechanised Divisions Légères de Cavalerie or DLC’s. These were smaller and weaker versions of the DLM and comprised of a mechanised brigade with a combat group of light tanks and a reconnaissance group of armoured cars, supported by two battalions of dragons portés.

Meanwhile, the infantry had come to accept that tanks would be needed in greater numbers. They had even decided that they might be concentrated at the corps or divisional level, but they were still tasked in the role of infantry support. It was not until 1934, when Colonel de Gaulle's celebrated book Vers L'Arniée de Métier proclaimed the need for a highly trained and professional mechanised army, that some original thinking was injected into the French military hierarchy. This gave a stimulus to the younger regular officers and soldiers of the time but in doing so frightened the politicians and General Staff. From then on the open discussion of any new ideas, particularly on mechanisation, which did not meet with official approval was stifled.

The infantry gradually evolved plans for grouping together armoured fighting vehicles but progress was painfully slow. Observations during the Spanish Civil War had confirmed, to the critics of armour, that anti-tank guns would be as devastating to tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles as the machine-gun had already proved to be against infantry formations. The French High Command, however, accepted that there should be some form of operational grouping of infantry medium tanks in a force heavier than battalion strength and so, eventually, during 1937/38 formal instructions on tactical doctrine were issued upon the employment of modern tanks and armoured formations. These instructions covered general principles and were totally based on theory. It was not until September 1939, after the Germans had invaded Poland and war had been declared, that four battalions of Char B’s were united into two demi-brigades, with two battalions of motorised infantry, with supporting artillery and engineers, to form the first Ire Division Cuirassée de Réserve (DCR). In January 1940 this armoured division was split up to help form a second by re-distribution of its available vehicles, replacing two battalions of Char B’s by two made up from the Hotchkiss H-39’s, previously regarded as a cavalry light tank by the infantry. The end result was two DCR’s made up from two demi-brigades each comprising one battalion of 33 Char B’s and one of 45 Hotchkiss H-39 light tanks, together with the associated battalion of motorised riflemen, artillery and engineers. A third DCR was formed in March 1940, whilst assembly of the fourth was hurriedly completed under General de Gaulle after the German assault had started in May 1940.

The DCR was heavily weighted in terms of tanks as opposed to infantry. The role of the DCR was still confined to that of a shock force used ahead of the infantry. It was without means of reconnaissance, air support or anti-aircraft defence and was therefore, in essence, an armoured combat group of strictly limited capability. The exploitation of an attack or counter-attack was to be handed over to a DLC or other motorised infantry formation to try to exploit.

Apart from those vehicles belonging to the DCR’s, there were over 1,000 other modern infantry tanks, excluding the aged Renaults FT’s, which were dispersed throughout France assigned to battalions supporting infantry field formations. By May 1940 both infantry and cavalry formations represented a formidable array of armoured fighting vehicles to be matched against any invading army, nearly 2,500 modern tanks in total. Unfortunately the German war machine only required some six weeks to render this force completely impotent and the Char B1, like many other French tanks, was taken into use by the Wehrmacht. The one-man turret was seen as a severe handicap for use within the Panzer divisions. The Char B was however, adapted for other purposes including driver training, where it was known as the Panzerkampfwagen (PzKpfw) B1 (f) Fahrschulewagen and again in 1942 when a conversion to self-propelled artillery was undertaken by Rheinmetall-Borsig. The tank turret was removed and a 105mm-field howitzer was mounted with limited traverse in a fixed, open-topped enclosure above the fighting compartment. Another conversion, known as the PzKpfw B1 Bis (f) Flammpanzer replaced the 7.5cm hull gun with a flame projector unit. The APX 4 turret with 47mm cannon was still retained, but only 24 of these conversions were ever made.

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Specifications (As-Built)

Char B1

* Total ammunition for both machine guns amounted to 5100 rounds (32 boxes).

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Char B1 bis

* Total ammunition for both machine guns amounted to 5100 rounds (32 boxes).

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  Char B1 ter

* Total ammunition for both machine guns amounted to 5100 rounds (32 boxes).

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Appendix A: Surviving Examples

There are definitely three, perhaps four, known surviving examples of the Char B1 bis. One, possibly two, at the French Cavalry School at Saumur, one at the Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum in Dorset, and lastly one at the Etablissement du Matériel at Gien.

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Appendix B: Production Figures

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Appendix C: Further Reading and Bibliography

Further Reading

Les Materiels de L’armee de Terre Francaise 1940, Stephen Ferrard

L’Automobile Sous L’Uniforme, Francois Vauviller & Jean-Michel Touraine, ISBN 2707201979

Les Vehicules Blindés Francais 1900-1944, Pierre Touzin, ISBN 2851200941

Gazette des Armes, Les Engins Blindes Francais 1920-1945, Hors Serie N^o 3

AFV Weapons Profiles N^o 36, Chars Hotchkiss, H35, H39 and Somua S35, Major James Bingham

AFV Weapons Profiles N^o 58, French Infantry Tanks: Part I (Chars 2C, D and B), Major James Bingham

AFV Weapons Profiles N^o 59, French Infantry Tanks: Part II (Including R 35 and FCM 36), Major James Bingham

Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two, Peter Chamberlain & Hilary Doyle, Technical Editor Thomas L Jentz, Arms & Armour Press, ISBN 1854095188

Panzer Truppen, The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force, 1933-1942, Thomas L Jentz, Schiffer Publishing Ltd, ISBN 0887409156

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Bibliography

Pictorial History of Tanks of the World 1915-45, Peter Chamberlain & Chris Ellis, Arms & Armour Press, ISBN 0853684979 (Background reading - great for photographs but not much information)

To Lose a Battle, Alistair Horne, Papermac, ISBN 0333536010 (Background reading – the definitive story of the Battle of France, reads like a slow Tom Clancy novel)

The Fall of France, Disaster in the West 1939-40, George Forty & John Duncan, Nutshell Publishing, ISBN 187187615X (Background reading – another interesting text on the Battle of France)

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Web Pages

On Armour
http://www.mobilixnet.dk/~mob75281/profiles/charb1/charb1.htm

Guns Vs Armour 1939 to 1945
http://www.wargamer.org/GvA/index.html

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